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Introduction

36
The world faces the challenge of meeting increasing energy demands while 37 achieving economic, social and environmental sustainability [1] . In the UK, the 38 energy challenge manifests itself through increasing political and public concern 39 about the national energy mix and rising prices [2, 3] . The UK's electricity 40 generation sector is based on existing coal and nuclear plants that are reaching the 41 end of their lives, reducing generation capacity [4] , while electricity demand is 42 projected to rise gradually [5] . As a result, spare capacity in the UK electricity 43 market is due to reduce in the next few years [6] . New infrastructure to fill the 44 potential gap between future electricity supply and demand, is estimated to require 45 £110 billion of investment over the next 10 years [7] . The UK Government sets the 46 overall framework for investment in energy infrastructure, but the private sector 47 determines where and when this investment will occur. 48
Biomass is a source of renewable energy that could help to meet these challenges. 49
Globally, it is already the largest source of renewable energy, and is expected to 50 expand to 80-160 EJ year -1 in 2050 from 50 EJ year -1 today [8, 9] . In the UK by 51 2020, it could provide 8-11% of the UK's total primary energy demand, a substantial 52 increase from 3% in 2012 [10] , and contribute to meeting the legally binding target 53 of generating 15% of energy consumption from renewable sources [11] . Agricultural 54 residues and energy crops are expected to have the greatest growth in UK domestic 55 3 biomass supply [10] . Previous research suggests that the potential energy crop area 56 in the UK will be around 1000 to 2000 kha in 2020 and 2030 [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . It has been 57 suggested that between 930 and 3630 kha of land in England and Wales could be 58 used to grow dedicated perennial energy crops, without impinging on food 59 production [10]. But UK Government policy plays a crucial role in determining the 60 level and rate of adoption of these technologies. 61
Perennial energy crops, Miscanthus and willow or poplar grown as short-rotation 62 coppice (SRC), have been grown in the UK since around 1996 [18] . Uptake has, 63 however, been limited, with a total area of only 11 kha in 2011, with the planting rate 64 dropping to only 0.5 kha year -1 in the period 2008-11 [19] . There is currently no 65 target for areas of these crops, although 350 kha by 2020 was suggested in the 66
Biomass Strategy [13] ; it is now expected that the actual figure will be much lower 67 [18] . This low uptake occurs in spite of policies to support the production of energy 68 crops, targeted at both farmers and energy generators. Since 2003, farmers in 69 England have had access to grants to cover a proportion of the establishment costs 70
for Miscanthus or SRC. The support rate was 50% for the last 5 years of the scheme, 71 which closed to new applicants in autumn 2013 [20] . Since Economic and behavioural factors are implicated in farmers' decisions to adopt 78 energy crops, and therefore potentially to explain the low uptake. Several studies 79 have looked at the economic aspects of energy crops, estimating the annual land 80 rental charge to account for the foregone opportunity to make greater returns from 81 other activities, or opportunity costs [15, 16, 23] . A similar approach has compared 82 annual gross margins of conventional crops with an equivalent annualised value for 83 perennial energy crops [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . A further method is to use a farm-scale economic 84 model, maximising gross margin, to investigate the potential uptake of perennial 85 energy crops [29] . These studies show that based on the economic case, energy 86 crops should have been adopted more widely, leading to a focus on possible 87 behavioural barriers to adoption. These might include cultural factors, awareness 88 and educational barriers, long-term commitment of land, and perceived risks [18,30-89 35] . There is heterogeneity in the level of economic and behavioural factors, 90 between farmers and over time, for example in investment return thresholds and risk 91 perceptions [36] . A 'chicken and egg' problem is also an apparent barrier; farmers 92 are unwilling to grow the crops without a more mature market, while potential 93 investors are unwilling to develop the plants and technologies that are required to 94 create the demand and so establish the market [30, 37] . The cyclic contingent 95 behaviour between farmers and plant investors increases the complexity of the 96 overall system, complicating analysis of the market. 97
Energy crops compete with other potential land uses, and so have the potential to 98 have positive and negative impacts on a range of environmental factors, e.g. 99 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, soil organic carbon (SOC), biodiversity and water 100 resources [38] [39] [40] [41] . Increased uptake of these crops is therefore relevant to other 101 5 policy objectives for the provision of ecosystem services, including food production 102
[42]. Biomass energy has on occasions been assumed or stated as having zero net 103 emissions of carbon dioxide [43, 44] , or given a zero emissions factor [45] . 104
Although the carbon released during the energy production has been captured during 105 plant growth, biomass use in energy generation potentially generates direct and 106 indirect sources of emissions [39, [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] . Direct emissions can occur in the 107 production, transport, handling and processing, while indirect emissions are 108 associated with land use change potentially causing SOC changes. These crops 109 could, therefore, potentially provide an important source of low carbon energy, and 110 so help to reduce the carbon intensity of energy production, as well as filling the gap 111 between future electricity supply and demand. But the relevant economic, social and 112 environmental trade-offs need to be understood to ensure sustainability. 113
The energy crop market is a complex system involving human decision-making by 114 many individuals, working within an evolving policy context. Moreover, economic, 115 ecological and social aspects of the system are strongly coupled, complicating 116 understanding of any single aspect. The potential benefits and drawbacks of the 117 adoption of these crops at scale requires the coupling to be more fully understood, 118 and to suggest ways that net societal benefits can be maximised. Furthermore, 119 related policies are currently in flux [7] , increasing the need for greater scientific 120 understanding of the trade-offs and analysis of which measures are appropriate and 121 cost-effective. The reasons for the lower than anticipated uptake of these crops to 122 date [18] also needs to be understood, and potential measures identified that could 123 help to stimulate the market. Details of the GHG balance calculation can be found in Alexander et al. [52] . The 173 total CO 2 e emissions abated and the total cost of subsidy were determined across the 174 40-year period, to give an average implied cost of carbon abatement. 175
Three policy scenarios for the farmer establishment grant rate were combined with 176 11 scenarios for renewable energy, to generate the set of policy scenarios tested. The 177 three farmer grants scenario had 0%, 50% and 100% support for establishment costs 178 respectively. The 11 renewable energy policy scenario are each expressed as a 179 trajectory of total revenue, including from wholesale electricity and subsidies, as per 180 the Contract for Difference mechanism, or as the rate of receiving renewable 181 obligation certificates (ROCs). In both cases these are per MWh of electricity 182 generated. It was assumed that support would fall to reflect the expectation of lower 
215
The total subsidy, including renewable energy and agricultural subsidies was plotted 216 against the biomass electricity generated, expressed on an annualised basis ( Figure  217 1,A). The cost of supporting the market increases with the size of that market. 218
The average subsidy cost per unit of electricity generation was determined by 219 dividing the annualised total subsidies by the total emissions abated, and was plotted 220 against the electricity generated, for all policy scenarios (Figure 1 The marginal cost of achieving biomass electricity generation and carbon abatement 231 may, in some circumstances, be a more relevant measure for evaluating policy 232 choices, than the average cost (Figure 1,B ). If the marginal cost of abatement is 233 rising with higher abatement, then for a given carbon price [69] ,, the marginal results 234 could be used to determine the most efficient level of abatement (and the associated 235 policy mix). This is where the marginal abatement curve equate to the given carbon 236 price. Any increase in abatement beyond this point would increase costs more than 237 the cost of carbon, and conversely reducing the abatement would mean that the cost 238 of emissions was greater than the cost to abate it. The same argument would apply if 239 there were a desired overall subsidy cost per unit of electricity for achieving biomass 240 generation. 241
To estimate the marginal costs for each point on a given farmer establishment grant 242 curve, a constant marginal value was assumed between points, i.e. constant gradient 243 of total subsidy against generation or abatement, e.g. the gradient of the line in 244 The emissions abatement where the average cost of carbon equals a particular carbon 253 price will be higher than for the marginal cost of carbon. This is because the last 254 abatement has occurred at a higher cost, until the averaged cost has been reduced to 255 the assumed level. Using the carbon price floor, prior to the 2014 budget, of £70 t 256 CO 2 -1 at 2030 [69] , then the marginal abatement cost curve ( Figure 2 ) suggests 8 257
MtCO 2 year -1 based on a 100% farmer establishment grant and a biomass generator 258 minimum price of £90 MWh -1 . The carbon abatement of the same average prices is 259 11 MtCO 2 e year -1 , with a higher biomass generator scenario price of £97 MWh -1 . 260
However, when the marginal costs are dropping, it is more useful to consider the 261 overall average costs, so that the cost impact of stimulating the more expensive early 262 adoption is taken into account. The analogous situation occurs with marginal and 263 average generation subsidy costs (Figure 1) . 264
Iso-carbon price points were calculated for prices at £5 CO 2 e -1 intervals from £65 to 265 90 t CO 2 e -1 , under each of the three rates of establishment grants used, and are 266 plotted in Figure 3 . These points are the combination of farmer and renewable 267 energy subsidies that produce a given carbon price from the market. Due to the U-268 shape curve two points for each establishment grant were possible, corresponding to 269 each side of the U, resulting in two lines for most carbon prices. At each end of the 270 plotted carbon prices, some points were not in the range of the scenarios run, giving 271 rise to fewer points on those lines. The upper sets of lines correspond to the higher 272 emission abatement scenarios, which have higher subsidies, but an equal carbon 273 price. 274
The subsidy levels that produce iso-carbon emission abatement were determined in 275 the same manner as for the iso-carbon price. These points were determined for 276 emissions abatement from 0.5 Mt CO 2 e to 16 CO 2 e, doubling the abatement between 277 each value; the figures are plotted in Figure 4 . Similar to the iso-carbon price lines, 278 some points of the highest and lowest abatements fall outside of the scenarios tested, 279 and are therefore omitted. Figure 4 shows that a repeated doubling of emissions 280 abatement can be achieved by an approximately constant increase in total subsidy 281 provided, as the lines plotted are broadly parallel and at a constant spacing. This 282 13 suggests a relatively constant relationship between changes in the subsidy levels and 283 an exponential change in emissions abatement. 284 Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the relationship between equally desirable points, to 285 achieve the stated carbon price or emission abatement. However, it seems highly 286 likely that both factors would be of relevance to most policy-makers or other 287 stakeholders. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the marginal carbon price and 288 emission abatement over the range of subsidy levels tested. 289
Discussion
290
To stimulate electricity generation or carbon abatement, the most cost-effective 291 policy scenario tested was with no farmer support and a subsidised biomass 292 electricity minimum price of £94 MWh -1 . The results suggest this would achieve an 293 average subsidy cost of £50 MWh -1 , although only a small market would be created 294 generating 0.3 TWh year -1 , and abating 0.3 MtCO 2 e year -1 . However, if the aim is 295 for more substantial electricity generation or carbon abatement, then providing direct 296 farmer support was found to provide the most cost-effective mix of policy measures. 297
The potential for electricity generation and carbon abatement of around 90 times 298 greater than this case, was seen within the policy scenarios tested. 299
For each level of farmer support, the minimum carbon equivalent abatement and 300 biomass electricity costs are obtained in scenarios with an intermediate subsidy level 301 for electricity generators. That is, the lowest implied carbon prices or biomass 302 support costs are not seen in either the lowest or highest renewable energy subsidy 303 scenarios. For example, with a 50% establishment grant the lowest average carbon 304 price of £57 t CO 2 e -1 and lowest support of £50 MWh -1 were obtained with a 305 14 minimum subsidised biomass electricity price of £87 MWh -1 . This behaviour arises, 306 as there is an interaction between economies of scale, primarily from the electricity 307 generators, and the increasing subsidy costs. Economies of scale occur as larger 308 plants are more efficient and the more developed markets are associated with lower 309 failure rates. The additional costs are initially more than offset by efficiency gains; 310 as the support level raises from the lowest subsidy scenarios, so the carbon price and 311 falls. However, eventually with further increases in the support level, the gains are 312 unable to overcome the escalating cost of the policy measures, and the subsidy costs 313 in terms of electricity generated and carbon abatement rises. This suggests that an 314 intermediate level of support for biomass electricity may be most cost effective at 315 stimulating emission reductions and the generation of biomass electricity from the 316 energy crop market. Nonetheless, the total carbon abatement, electricity generated 317 and subsidy costs all rise with an increases in the rate of subsidy renewable energy 318 subsidy (Figure 1,A) . 319
The results demonstrate the trade-offs between providing subsidies to farmers or 320 renewable electricity generators. The consequence of these trade-offs is that the 321 development or evaluation of energy and agricultural policy must be considered 322 together. Without a coherent set of policies it is unlikely that the desired outcomes 323 will be achieved in the most efficient manner. One example of this is the farmer 324 establishment grant. Providing farmers' establishment grants has been shown to 325 increase both the emissions abatement potential and potentially cost-effectiveness 326 (Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). However, the Energy Crop Scheme, providing such 327 support, closed for new applications in August 2013. It is unclear whether a 328 replacement will be put in place, although there have been calls for a new scheme 329 15 [18, 70] . There is an expectation that this will cause the, albeit limited, current 330 market momentum to be lost [70] , as occurred during the previous gap in funding in 331 2006 [18] . There may be alternative mechanisms to support farmers to grow these 332 crops, perhaps through the Common Agricultural Policy, which merits further 333 investigation [70] . number of farmers have adopted to produce supply for that plant, that area is more 352 likely to be selected for further plant development, and associated energy crop 353 growth. The existence of farmers already growing energy crops increases the 354 number of farmers who are willing to consider growing them. The increased pool of 355 farmers potentially increases the availability of supply, which in turn increases the 356 likelihood, and the potential size, of further plants in that proximity. The spatial 357 reinforcement, or agglomeration, means that initial plant locations can create a 358 significant influence on the overall outcome. The significance of this effect is 359 supported by the adoption patterns and locations observed in Swedish SRC market 360
[37] and is also a part of a proposed conceptual framework for the introduction of 361 energy crops [71] . 362
Implication for biofuels 363
The production of second-generation biofuels, produced from a ligno-cellulosic 364 feedstock, potentially provides a new market for perennial energy crops. Despite the 365 slower than anticipated development to commercial scale, there are now a number of 366 pilot second-generation biofuel plants operating globally [72] . This provides the 367 realistic prospect that such plants will be built in the UK in the near future. The 368 ligno-cellulose bio-refineries have different economic and emission abatement 369 characteristics from the biomass power plants represented in the model presented 370 here. These differences will alter the energy crop market's potential for emissions 371 abatement and response to policy incentives. Nonetheless, there are some 372 implications from the results that are likely to remain, and conclusions that can be 373 drawn, that are relevant to the production of second-generation biofuels in the UK. 374
The addition of a new source of demand is unlikely to alter the process of farmers' 375 adoption of novel crops, based on the spatial diffusion of uptake, resulting in long 376 time lags. Claims have been made that second-generation biofuels will form a 377 significant component of the UK's least cost energy system to 2050 [73] . Therefore, 378 if biofuel production from energy crops is important in the UK's future energy mix, 379 an additional justification can be made for currently supporting electricity production 380 from energy crops. The long time lags in achieving adoption from farmers can be 381 overcome by establishing a market as early as possible, so that when additional 382 demand is required (for example, for biofuel production), further and more rapid 383 expansion is easier to achieve. The greater the size and geographic spread of the 384 existing market, the quicker the market should be able to respond to provide 385 additional supply. Although this is likely to be an upper limit when a high 386 proportion of the suitable land has been established. However, even with the highest 387 levels of subsidy, the maximum energy crop area obtained was 2900 kha, less than 388 the published upper estimate of 3630 kha for land available without impinging of 389 food production [10]. Market Reform proposals is to decarbonise energy generation in a cost-effective 398 manner, while maintaining security of supply. It contains three main elements; a 399 feed-in tariff using the Contract for Difference mechanism, a carbon price floor, and 400 a capacity market. Under Contract for Difference contracts, a single fixed price level 401 known as the 'strike price' replaces generators revenues, from electricity and 402 Renewable Obligations. The draft Contract for Difference strike prices are claimed 403 to have been set to be consistent with the total revenue under this previous scheme 404 [7] . The initial strike price is £125 MWh -1 [64], inline with the policy scenarios 405 tested. 406
There are several specific elements of the proposed policy changes that have the 407 potential to radically alter the development of the UK energy crop market. Firstly, 408 the technologies that are eligible for support are proposed to change. New build 409 electricity only plants would not receive support; new plants would be required to be 410 combined heat and power (CHP) facilities to be eligible. Also, co-firing, using a 411 proportion of biomass in existing coal fired power station, would no longer be 412 supported, and only complete conversion to biomass from these facilities would be 413 accepted. Secondly, the energy crop premium would be removed, this currently pays 414 an additional 0.5 ROC MWh -1 (or around £18-20 MWh -1 ) for producing electricity 415 from energy crops, in comparison to other sources of biomass. Thirdly the terms of 416 the support contracts are being changed. Perhaps most importantly, the contract 417 length with RO was 20 years, but with the Contract for Difference scheme it would 418 be reduced to 15 years in general, but with a cap, specifically for biomass contacts, to 419 cease paying in 2027. After these contracts end, the support for renewable projects 420 will be indirectly through the climate change levy. The climate change levy is a tax 421 applied to the fossil fuels used to generate electricity, with a minimum level via the 422 carbon price floor. The carbon price floor is due to be £70 Mt CO 2 e -1 in 2030, which 423 is expected to increase the wholesale electricity price from £50 MWh -1 to £70 MWh -424 1 Affairs, potentially making coordinated policy decision-making more difficult. An 446 illustration of this can be seen in the ending of the establishment grant scheme for 447 farmers, just as some evidence emerged suggesting the important role that it plays in 448 the uptake and efficiency of the market. Overall, the results and recent policy 449 developments appear to suggest that domestically grown perennial energy crops in 450 the UK will only play a niche role, in the short term. A coherent and stable set of 451 related policies is needed to ensure that the potential for the energy crop market to 452 deliver significant emissions abatement, and to provide a source of renewable 453 electricity is achieved, and in a cost-effective manner. 454
Supporting energy crop markets for electricity generation provides an additional 455 benefit of increasing future supply capacity, if the production of second-generation 456 biofuel from energy crops is envisioned to expand rapidly in the future. Long time 457 lags (up to 20 years) for farmers to adopt of novel crops, such as energy crops, are 458 seen both in the modelled results and in empirical data. These time lags arise from 459 the behavioural aspects of farmers' decision-making, and imply that it may be 460 problematic to rapidly achieve a large quantity of energy crop production. Currently, 461 supporting biomass electricity generation could therefore be viewed as creating 462 'option value' for future ligno-cellulosic biofuel feedstock supply. 
